As dedicated Marlins fans—we
go to 20 games a year and watch almost every other game on TV—my wife and I are
surely disappointed that the new Marlins ownership has lowered player salaries
by jettisoning three starters—Dee Gordon, Giancarlo Stanton and Marcell Ozuna.
But as realists, we are
not at all surprised. How could it be otherwise?
Anyone focused on
reality, as opposed to emotion-driven name-calling—in other words, anyone who
considers it necessary to base opinions on the facts as they are and not as one
wants them to be—knew that holding onto these high-priced stars made no
long-term sense.
Why? Because of a few
undeniable facts, both of the baseball and financial variety.
First, the baseball
facts:
1.
The team was
a chronic loser with Stanton and
Gordon and Ozuna. Let’s look at their record since they moved into Marlins Park
in 2012:
Year
|
Record
|
Games Out in NL East
|
Games Stanton Played
|
…Ozuna
|
…Gordon
|
2012
|
69-93
|
29
|
123
|
0
|
0
|
2013
|
62-100
|
34
|
116
|
0
|
0
|
2014
|
77-85
|
19
|
145
|
153
|
0
|
2015
|
71-91
|
19
|
74
|
123
|
145
|
2016
|
79-82
|
15.5
|
119
|
148
|
79
|
2017
|
77-85
|
20
|
159
|
159
|
158
|
2.
Their
starting pitching—even had Jose Fernandez not died—was mediocre or worse. You
need four starters to win. One does not do it. Aside from the young starter who came from nowhere, Jose Urena, starters the Marlins used in 2017 were over-the-hill or marginal—think Dan Straley, Adam Conley, Edinson Volquez, Tom
Koehler, and Vance Worley. Yes, Urena had a good 2017 (14-3 W/L, 3.82 E.R.A., 1.273
WHIP), but no one can say whether what he displayed last year is replicable.
But for every Urena there was a Justin Nicolino, an Odrisamer Despaigne, or, my
favorite, a Wei-Yin Chen, an oft-injured lefty who parlayed one decent year
(2014 at age 28) with the Orioles into a ludicrous 5-year, $80 million
backloaded contract (he’ll earn $24,600,000 in 2020). This, from the same
management team that lavished millions on John Buck, Jarrod Saltalamacchia,
Heath Bell, and similar busts.
3.
Their relief
pitching was equally suspect. Of the 5 Marlins pitchers with the most relief
appearances, they had WHIP of 1.200, 1.379, 1,339, 1.392, and 1.553. The The
Marlins dished out major dollars to a 37-year-old submariner, Brad Ziegler,
whose best years were long behind him: his cumulative ERA since debuting in
2008 (including 2017) was 2.61; in 2017, 4.79. His average WHIP, 1.252; 2017,
1.553.
4.
Their depth
was non-existent. Compare the Astros’ 2017 top three non-starting position
players to the Marlins’:
G
|
PA
|
AB
|
R
|
H
|
2B
|
3B
|
HR
|
RBI
|
SB
|
CS
|
BB
|
SO
|
BA
|
|
Astros
|
||||||||||||||
Marwin Gonzalez
|
134
|
515
|
455
|
67
|
138
|
34
|
0
|
23
|
90
|
8
|
3
|
49
|
99
|
.303
|
Evan Gattis
|
84
|
325
|
300
|
41
|
79
|
22
|
0
|
12
|
55
|
0
|
1
|
18
|
50
|
.263
|
Jake Marisnick
|
106
|
259
|
230
|
50
|
56
|
10
|
0
|
16
|
35
|
9
|
4
|
20
|
90
|
.243
|
Marlins
|
||||||||||||||
JT Riddle
|
70
|
247
|
228
|
20
|
57
|
13
|
1
|
3
|
31
|
0
|
2
|
12
|
50
|
.250
|
Ichiro Suzuki
|
136
|
215
|
196
|
19
|
50
|
6
|
0
|
3
|
20
|
1
|
1
|
17
|
35
|
.255
|
Tyler Moore
|
104
|
203
|
187
|
17
|
43
|
14
|
0
|
6
|
30
|
0
|
0
|
10
|
56
|
.230
|
5. As usual, the Marlins’ minor league system was bare. At the end of the 2017, their minor league system was ranked 28th by Baseball America. Even after the trades of Gordon, Stanton and Ozuna, not a single guy in their farm system was rated in Baseball’s Top 100 by MLB Pipeline. Just look at their 2013-2017 top draft choices to get an idea why:
a.
2013 Colin
Moran, 3B (now with Astros, .206 BA, 34 AB);
b.
2013 Matt
Krook, LHP (never signed by Marlins);
c.
2014 Tyler
Kolek, RHP (still in Rookie League);
d.
2014 Blake
Anderson, C (switched to pitcher, Gulf League);
e.
2015 Josh
Naylor, 1B (traded to Padres in 2016; low minor leagues)
f.
2016 Braxton
Garrett, LHP (yet to play: Tommy John surgery)
g.
2017 Trevor
Rogers (yet to play)
How did the Marlins get
that way? Were all their front-office baseball people total dolts? Maybe they
were below-average talent evaluators, but is that the sole reason for the
Marlins’ sustained mediocrity? Not likely. More likely it’s at least largely,
if not exclusively, a lack of cash to spend on first-class scouts,
cross-checkers, data analysts and the other sources of baseball knowledge. Any question
why is there not enough cash?
That leads to the
financial facts.
1.
It has been
widely noted that the Marlins have been last or near to last in the National
League in attendance for years. But what is the effect of this lousy attendance
on team revenues?
This is the Marlins’ reported
home attendance since 2012, when they moved to Marlins Park (still named
generically). The “Gap in Dollars” estimates that, as Fortune reports, the average Marlins ticket-buyer spent $33 per
ticket plus concessions per game.
Year
|
Marlins
|
ML
Average
|
Marlins’
Rank
|
Difference
|
Gap
in Dollars
|
2012
|
2,219,444
|
2,495,309
|
18
|
275,865
|
9,103,543
|
2013
|
1,586,322
|
2,467,563
|
29
|
881,241
|
29,080,959
|
2014
|
1,732,283
|
2,457,987
|
27
|
725,704
|
23,948,245
|
2015
|
1,752,235
|
2,458,668
|
28
|
706,433
|
23,312,280
|
2016
|
1,712,417
|
2,438,636
|
28
|
726,219
|
23,965,214
|
2017
|
1,651,997
|
2,422,347
|
28
|
770,350
|
25,421,564
|
For nostalgia’s sake,
let’s look at 2003, the last year the Marlins made the playoffs and won the
World Series:
Year
|
Marlins
|
ML Average
|
Marlins’
Rank
|
Difference
|
Gap in Dollars
|
2003
|
1,303,214
|
2,256,300
|
28
|
953,086
|
33,358,003
|
2.
But that’s
only attendance and concessions. How about local TV revenue. Figures from Fangraph for 2016 show that Miami is
locked into a local TV contract through 2019 paying them $20 million a year;
the mean payment per team was $53.5 million, while the median was $46 million.
Split the difference, and the Marlins bank $30 million a year less than the
average team from local TV rights. Meanwhile, media reports claim that the
Marlins earn next to nothing from radio rights. So, between attendance and TV
revenues, they’re in the hole about $55 million a year (throwing out 2012
attendance, their first year in the new park). No wonder they had to lower
their payroll by $25 million a year—and, we can pray, put some of the
difference into a quality farm system and analytics group.
Finally, let’s compare
the years at Marlins Park when Stanton was injured for a major portion of the
season and when he was not injured, to see if the fans turned out to see their
star when he was playing.
Year
|
Games Stanton played
|
Marlins Attendance
|
2012
|
123
|
2,219,444
|
2013
|
116
|
1,586,322
|
2014
|
145
|
1,732,283
|
2015
|
74
|
1,752,235
|
2016
|
119
|
1,712,417
|
2017
|
159
|
1,651,997
|
As you can see, there’s
no correlation. Indeed, in 2017, when he had the greatest year any Marlin has
ever had and likely will ever have, attendance dropped overall, even though he
played in 159 games.
So, for all who seek to
cast blame for this situation, why blame the owners, capitalists all—from Wayne
Huizenga to John Henry to Jeffrey Loria to Bruce Sherman/Derek Jeter. Who can
blame them for either growing tired of losing money or not wanting to lose
money from the outset? Who would willingly buy a business to lose money? Yes,
business losses can be written off a tax return, but until people pay taxes at
a 100% rate, no one comes out ahead by incurring business losses.
The only solution to
this team’s financial woes will be increased attendance and TV viewership. But
what chance is there that, as the Miami
Herald has reported the Sherman/Jeter business plan reflected, attendance
revenue and local TV revenue are going to increase sharply?
If you’re looking for
people to blame, look at the people who don’t go to Marlins games, don’t listen
to them on the radio, and don’t watch them on TV. No one is required to do any
of the three. But if people want to get angry and fulminate, but stay even
somewhat tethered to reality, they should start by looking in the mirror.
When you’re though
looking in the mirror, concede this: this is a lousy baseball town. Then ask
whether you’re willing to do anything about it.
